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The  concession  agreement  for  the  modernization  and  operation  of  Indira  Gandhi  International 
airport in Delhi and Chhatrapati Shivaji International airport at Mumbai respectively is referred to as 
Operation Management and Development Agreement (OMDA). The OMDA was a part of a set of 
transaction  documents  along  with  the  request  for  proposal  provided  to  potential  bidders.  The 
OMDA laid out the contractual terms for structuring the PPP. This paper discusses the evolution of 
the draft OMDA from when it was first released in April 2005 to the bidders till it was released as a 
final OMDA in August 2005 before an extended bidding date. During this period, some of the critical 
issues addressed were: limits to commercial development of airport land, nature of tariff regulatory 
regime, contingent liabilities including performance bonds and termination payments, and potential 
contractual and strategic conflicts. It brings out the intra governmental issues and processes, and the 
significant learning that formed part of these PPP concessions, which could well be among the largest 
in the world. 
                                                 
1 Prepared by Profs. Ajay Pandey, Sebastian Morris and G. Raghuram of the Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad. 
Authors can be contacted at apandey@iimahd.ernet.in, morris@iimahd.ernet.in and graghu@iimahd.ernet.in respectively.  
We acknowledge the inputs provided by Ms Rachna Gangwar. 
This paper is based mainly on secondary information. It borrows facts from the cases titled ‘Airport Privatization: Bidding 
Process for Delhi and Mumbai (A), (B), (C), (D) and (E)’ written by Prof Rekha Jain, Prof G Raghuram and Rachna 
Gangwar of Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad. In addition, this paper also makes use of information obtained 
from public authorities involved in the process of privatization of these airports. The OMDA is available on the website of 
Airports Authority of India (www.aai.aero). The writers are grateful for the comments provided by Shri Gajendra Haldea, 
Adviser to Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, Ms Namita Mehrotra, Director Planning Commission and Ms Anna 
Roy, Director, Ministry of Finance. The writers are, however, solely responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation. 
Teaching material of the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad is prepared as a basis for class discussion. Cases are 
not designed to present illustrations of either correct or incorrect handling of administrative problems. 
Copyright © 2010 by the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad and the Planning Commission, Government of India  
   
W.P.  No.  2010-11-03  Page No. 3 
IIMA  ￿  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
Structuring PPPs in Aviation Sector:  
Case of Delhi and Mumbai Airport Privatization 
 
The Inter Ministerial Group (IMG), constituted by Ministry of Civil Aviation (MoCA) to assist the 
Empowered  Group  of  Ministers  (EGoM),  had  been  seized  of  various  issues  in  the  course  of 
awarding long term concessions for the Delhi and Mumbai Airports. These efforts to attract private 
participation  were  initiated  following  the  Cabinet  decision  of  the  National  Democratic  Alliance 
government in September 2003 to restructure Delhi and Mumbai airports.  The idea was to bring in 
the private sector through a long term PPP concession by setting up a Joint Venture (JV) of a private 
player (or a consortium) with the Airports Authority of India (AAI). The AAI was a public sector 
entity owning and managing Delhi, Mumbai and all other commercial airports in India, excluding 
Cochin.  Bangalore  and  Hyderabad  airports  had  also  been  awarded  to  private  entities  on  Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) basis in 2004. The motivation for this move was to develop the airports of 
India’s two most important cities as world class airports. There was much that was lacking in the 
operations at these airports.   
 
Demand had grown very rapidly, especially since the reform of the Indian economy in the early 
nineties (Exhibit 1). The entry of private players in the domestic airline industry had led to a steady 
growth in traffic and improvement in the quality of flight services. Ground level services, however, 
had not improved, leading to growing congestion and difficulty imposed on passengers at airports. 
Facilities were poor, even in areas that could be considered as basic – toilets and restaurants at 
airports, lounge facilities, connectivity from one terminal to another, and clearance of baggage.  
 
Major airports also had passenger related commercial activities like shopping areas, travel related 
services, cargo and warehousing facilities etc. In comparison to similar sized airports, internationally 
and more particularly of neighboring South East Asian countries, this potential had not been fully 
exploited  in  Mumbai  or  Delhi  airports.  Nor were  hotel  and  other  facilities  adequately  provided, 
especially at the Delhi airport  
 
Despite the change of government to the United Progressive Alliance in 2004, the process was taken 
further by the Government of India (GoI). The EGoM and IMG were reconstituted. The Expression 
of Interest was invited in July 2004. The global technical advisor, financial consultant, legal consultant 
and accounting and tax advisor were appointed. The Request for Proposal (RFP) along with draft 
transaction documents was released to nine prequalified bidders on April 1, 2005. After receiving the 
RFP and other documents, as part of their due diligence, the prequalified bidders were to visit the 
airports, undertake site inspection, meet the MoCA and other relevant government agencies, examine 
all available data, and comment on the draft transaction documents. The bid submission was slated 
for June 24, 2005, by which time the draft transaction documents were to be finalized.  
 
The RFP required that the bidders submit technical and financial bids at the same time. The technical 
bids were  to  be  evaluated for (i)  Management  Capability,  Commitment  and  Value  Add,  and (ii) 
Development Capability, Commitment and Value Add. These were to be evaluated on a number of 
sub factors and only those who scored a minimum of 80 on both parameters were to go on to the 
next  stage,  when  their  financial  bids  were  to  be  opened.  The  financial  bids  would  specify  the 
percentage revenue they were willing to share with the Government. 
 
During this period, the transaction documents which included the OMDA were being drafted. They 
were to be ready for study by the bidders before the bid submission. While reviewing the draft 
OMDA, the member of the IMG representing the Planning Commission (PC) highlighted many 
issues which could cause problems in the post bid phase. These were discussed by the IMG. It soon 
became clear that the documents cannot be finalized in time for the bid submission, which was then 
postponed. The transaction documents, including the OMDA, could be finalized only by August 30, 
2005 due to which the bid date was extended to September 14, 2005.  
 
This  paper  discusses  the  major  issues  which  influenced  the  revision  of  the  OMDA  and  related 
documents. 
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Commercial Development of Airport Land 
 
Prior to the proposed private participation, no significant attempt had been made to provide modern 
amenities  for  passengers,  although  surplus  land  was  available  after  accounting  for  aeronautical 
requirements of the airports. Since these airports were well within the urban agglomeration of the 
cities, the land value for commercial use was very significant. The consultants to GoI expected that 
these ‘surplus’ lands would be utilized for pure commercial activities independent of aeronautical 
activities.  They  recommended  that the selected  bidder  should  be allowed  to use  these  lands  for 
shopping malls, technology parks, office complexes, business parks, golf course etc. 
 
The  OMDA  classified  the  assets  created  at  the  airport  in  several  categories.  Firstly,  assets were 
classified  based  on  whether  they  were  aeronautical  and  non  aeronautical/commercial.  The  non 
aeronautical/commercial  assets  were  further  distinguished  on  whether  they  were  to  perform 
commercial activities related to passenger/cargo traffic and thus located within the terminal building 
or associated facilities or those which are outside this ambit like hotels. Schedule 19 of the draft 
OMDA classified these non aeronautical/commercial asset types under Part I (Transfer Assets) and 
Part II (Non Transfer Assets) respectively. Separate treatment was to be meted out to assets at the 
time of transfer of the project to AAI based on the category they fell under. While AAI was obliged 
to take over the assets which were regarded as necessary for rendering the aeronautical services (Part 
I assets) at the time of buy out or transfer of the project, the option was with the AAI to decide 
whether to take over the assets meant for non aeronautical services (Part II assets) or to let them 
continue with the JV. Separate methods of valuation were prescribed for these two categories for 
determining the price at the time of transfer.   
 
The draft OMDA included in its scope aeronautical and non aeronautical services.  It laid out in 
Schedule 19 Part II that the airport land can be used for construction of business parks, high tech 
parks, commercial offices, leisure activities, shopping complexes, sports complex, golf course, etc.  
 
The above raised several legal and policy issues. Firstly, it was not clear whether AAI, which was a 
statutory body created under the Airports Authority of India Act of 1994, was empowered to use the 
land  for  the  commercial  purposes  in  the  manner  proposed  under  OMDA.  In  case  it  was  not 
empowered to undertake these activities itself, it could not have leased the land to another party for 
commercial purposes. The issue became more important as the Policy on Airport Infrastructure in 
clause 12.1 stated that “there will be a major thrust towards increasing the share of commercial 
revenue emerging from non aeronautical sources”.  
 
The option of acquiring the non transfer assets immediately gave rise to issues such as:  
 
(a) What would be the price at which AAI can buy non transfer assets?  
(b) Whether these assets can be mortgaged? and 
(c) Whether or not there would be conflict of interest in the event of the airport and the non transfer 
assets eventually being in separate hands? 
 
It was pointed out by the PC that the non transfer assets at the time of expiry of the concession 
period of  thirty/sixty years may have very high prices forcing AAI to forego taking up non transfer 
assets. This would result in fragmentation of airport with transfer assets being vested with AAI and 
the non transfer asset with a private player, both having divergent objectives. The PC also pointed 
out that the OMDA also allowed the JV or its sub lessees to create encumbrances by mortgaging of 
non transferable  assets,  which  can  create  difficulty  in  getting  back  the  assets  at  the  end  of  the 
concession period. Hence, the encumbrances should also not be allowed for non transferable assets. 
 
While MoCA took the view that AAI could use the land for commercial purposes, the PC felt that 
the AAI Act did not allow AAI to use the land for commercial purposes save the use of land for 
passenger amenities incidental to its functions, including hotels, restaurants, etc. as provided in the 
Act. Reference was made by MoCA to the Attorney General of India who opined that amendment to 
AAI Act of 1994 would be necessary before AAI could lease land to the JV for outright commercial 
purposes (which are not incidental to the functions of AAI as stipulated in the AAI Act).  
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In schedule 19  of  the  final OMDA,  the  development of land for  outright  commercial purposes 
unrelated to the airport or passengers, was eventually omitted. Exhibits 2 and 3 provide a list of 
services defined as aeronautical and non aeronautical (part I and part II) in the final OMDA. 
 
Even on non aeronautical services incidental to the functions of AAI such as hotel(s) for passengers 
transiting through the airports, the PC’s view was that the same can be leased out directly by the AAI 
to a hotel operator without assigning such parcel to the JV. This approach, it was argued, would fetch 
better value to AAI as a hotel operator would pay a better price for a lease directly from the AAI as 
compared to a sub lease from the JV, especially as the hotel plots were virtually independent of the 
airport. It also favored doing away with the idea of non transfer assets as the non transfer assets were 
for providing non aeronautical services (part II) incidental to functioning of airports. Separating the 
assets as transfer and non transfer assets, it argued, may fragment the development of the airports in 
the future.   
 
Eventually, according to the final OMDA (Chapter 19, Clause 6(b)), the non transfer asset on the 
expiry of agreement would be transferred back to the AAI, at its option, at the fair market value of 
non transfer assets less the market value of the land. The process for determination of fair market 
value would be done by two independent valuers, one each by the AAI and by the JV from a panel of 
five valuers proposed by the President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. The final 
OMDA also restricted the land use for non transfer assets to five percent of land for Delhi and ten 
percent for Mumbai airport. Effectively, the area of land use for pure commercial development on 
permissible non aeronautical services was restricted.  
 
In the initial stages, the value of non transfer assets at the time of their transfer was proposed to be 
“based on fair market value (which is determined based on standard methodologies, including the use 
of the net present value as one of the methods to be reduced by the then prevailing market lease 
rental for the underlying land as also for O&M revenue and capital expenditure for the economic life 
of  such  assets)”.  PC  pointed  out  that  instead  of  market  lease  rental,  the  land  value  should  be 
subtracted based on its market value. It pointed out that it is relatively easier to ascertain market value 
than the “capitalized value of the market lease rent for the economic life or the term, whichever is 
lower” due to absence of similar use of land in the locality. Moreover, it argued that when the land 
was being given free to the JV, the reversion value should not be loaded in favour of the JV.  
 
The EGoM decided that the deduction at the time of transfer back to AAI would be on the basis of 
prevailing market value of land, and the OMDA was revised accordingly.   
 
Nature of Tariff Regulatory Regime and Uncertainty 
 
The concession structure envisaged bidding based on the percentage of total revenue of the airport to 
be paid to AAI. Further, the bidders would also have to pay a pre determined upfront fee to the AAI. 
The bidder offering the highest revenue share was to be declared winner provided it was pre qualified 
and scored more than 80 on each of the two dimensions in the technical bid. In the event of the same 
bidder being the highest in both the airports, it would get the airport where the second bid was 
farther away from its bid. The successful bidder for the other airport would be the one with the 
second best offer, provided it matched the best offer.  
 
Aeronautical and Non-Aeronautical Charges 
 
Since the overall revenues of the JV would be dependent on the fee it could charge for aeronautical 
and non aeronautical services, it was important that the basis of determination of these charges be 
spelt out, given that a monopoly was being granted to the JV. The JV was to charge, initially for three 
years, the rates specified by the GoI for aeronautical services while it was free to charge rates for non 
aeronautical services on a competitive basis. Subsequently, the aeronautical rates were to be charged 
based on rates specified by the proposed Airport Economic Regulatory Authority (AERA) or the 
GoI. This meant that while the aeronautical fees were to be regulated, the non aeronautical charges 
and  revenues  would  be  unregulated  creating  strong  incentives  for  revenue generating  non 
aeronautical business at the cost of non revenue generating passenger services in the absence of any 
formal control in terms of performance standards on passenger services and amenities.  
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It was pointed out by the PC that a revenue share on aeronautical tariffs would normally imply that 
the  JV  would  make  losses  on  the  aeronautical  side  and  cover  them  by  incomes  on  the  non 
aeronautical side. In case the incomes from its non aeronautical side were inadequate, it will not 
invest adequately on the aeronautical side. Hence, the entire airport operation would be driven by 
non aeronautical operations. 
 
Regulatory uncertainty could also come from whether and which of the non aeronautical revenues 
would be allowed by the regulator to be excluded and how the cost base could be altered to deduct 
the rate base associated with non aeronautical revenues. Under the OMDA, all revenues from non 
aeronautical assets were to form part of the revenue pool from which the AAI share was to be paid. 
On the other hand, all costs on development of non aeronautical assets, such as hotels, were to be 
kept out of the cost base.Despite these regulatory uncertainties, it was notable that none of the 
bidders asked for clarifications. MoCA insisted on continuing with the process, despite the problem 
being pointed out, as changing the RFP at this stage would have caused delays. The State Support 
Agreement  (SSA)  finalized  later provided in  its  Schedule 1 that  the  aeronautical  tariffs  and  user 
charges would continue to be determined by MoCA in case AERA does not come into existence.  
 
Cost Plus Model 
 
The revenue share model with regulated aeronautical tariffs also had the potential to create regulatory 
uncertainty or to restrict regulatory effectiveness. Since the aeronautical tariff was to be fixed on a 
‘cost plus’ basis, it had all the disadvantages associated with this arrangement such as gold plating of 
costs and inadequate incentives for efficiency in expenses, as pointed out by the PC. It could also bias 
the bidding process as the bidders may bid for higher revenue share but may subsequently increase 
the  capital  costs,  operating  expenses  and  tariffs  beyond  what  is  optimal  from  the  end user’s 
perspective. Therefore, the PC advocated that the tariffs should be based on pre determined price 
caps or incentive based regulation so that there was regulatory certainty and no incentive for gold 
plating of costs and expenses. 
 
Further, it was indicated that the upfront fee and revenue share/annual fee paid by the bidder will not 
be part of the cost for determination of aeronautical tariff. For the first two years of operation, the JV 
was not allowed any increase in tariff. In the third year of operation, an increase in 10% over the base 
cost was allowed provided the mandatory capital projects were completed within the prescribed time 
line. From the fourth year onwards, a rise in tariff as per the SSA was provided for.  
 
The cost plus model for tariff fixation as included in the Schedule 1 is given in Exhibit 4. This model 
envisaged a vector of price capped tariffs for the different aeronautical services, which would be 
increased year to year by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) less an efficiency factor X. This would help 
determine the present value of forecasted aeronautical revenues and compare the same with what is 
required to cover permissible costs including a cross subsidy from non aeronautical revenues.  Given 
the cost plus tariff regime proposed in the SSA, the OMDA did not dwell on the issue of capital costs 
associated with the development of airports.  
 
Master Plan and Regulatory Asset Base 
 
It was expected that successful bidders would propose a master plan for development of Mumbai and 
Delhi airports after signing the OMDA. Prior to that, all the bidders were expected to submit an 
initial development plan as part of the bid. There was no binding commitment associated with the 
initial development plan, and the master plan may differ from the development plan. The master plan 
had  to  incorporate  the  mandatory  capital  projects  specified  in  the  bid  documents,  the  initial 
development plan, development standards mandated in the OMDA and had to also take into account 
the stakeholders’ views as inputs. The AAI and MoCA were expected to review and approve the plan. 
The  winning  bidder was  expected to submit the master  plan  within nine months  of signing the 
OMDA.  
 
An  issue  which  emerged  was  that  while  AAI,  being  a  statutory  body,  was  exempt  from  taking 
approval of the master plan for the airports from local government, the same would not be applicable  
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for the JV. It was also pointed out that the local government may restrict land use for non transfer 
assets. An issue brought out by the PC in the IMG was that the MoCA, and not AAI, should approve 
the master plan, as they retained commercial interest in the JV to the extent of 26% besides getting 
the revenue share. Preferably, all parameters should be laid out in the OMDA and no subsequent 
approvals should be mandated.  
 
The PC also raised the point that it was appropriate to first decide on land use, and land related 
restraints and possibilities, before going through the bid process. Otherwise, the bidders may focus 
on rents arising out of developing land for commercial and peripheral purposes. Rather than focusing 
on passenger amenities as befitting an international class airport, the developments could be in other 
areas.  Concerns  were  raised  that  the  master  plan  proposed  may  be  motivated  by  commercial 
considerations  rather  than  the  utility  of  the  airport  users.  Developments  could  be  focused  on 
locations which maximize non aeronautical revenues or overall profits rather than those which are 
best from the users’ view point. In this context, the PC pointed out that the location of the new 
terminal building in the case of Delhi airport was planned to be away from the national highway, 
whereas the commercial area was earmarked closer to the National Highway. In the view of the PC, 
the location of the terminal needed to be closer to the National Highway to benefit the users. 
 
In the final OMDA, the period for submission of the master plan was restricted to six months as 
decided by the EGoM. The AAI was simply to be informed and the MoCA was to review the master 
plan. Master plans had to be submitted every ten years. The JV retained the right to sub contract, 
sub license and license at the airport. It would have full responsibility to deliver the transfer and non 




The master plan requirements coupled with the absence of a regulatory body and the ‘cost plus’ 
regime envisaged in the OMDA gave rise to a number of questions such as: 
 
(a) Should the government mandate an investment level upfront that would limit the extent of  a pass 
through to tariff?  
(b) Should the proposed investment be approved by the government?  
(c) Would the regulator have a role in verifying costs?  
(d) Is it fair to the private partner if the costs are verified after investments are made?  
(e) Who is protecting the consumer interest till a regulator is in place?  
(f) What are the safeguards against gold plating of capital costs? and 
(g)  Given  that  the  regulation  of  aeronautical  charges  constitutes  a  vector  applied  over  multiple 
activities, how do we prevent the abuse of the degrees of freedom? 
 
Performance and Bid Bond 
 
The financial consultants to GoI proposed an upfront fee of Rs 10 billion. This was resisted in a 
meeting of the IMG earlier in January 2005. One of the members commented, “The IMG meetings 
usually rely on the presentations made by the consultants, but no agenda papers or minutes are 
circulated.  The  depth  of  consideration  needs  to  improve  if  we  wish  to  reach  anywhere  near 
international standards.” Initially, the bidders were expected to post a performance bond for Rs 50 
billion for 50 years. Similarly, the bid bond was proposed to be Rs 50 billion. The PC objected to the 
tenure of the performance bond and the amount of the bid bond. They argued for a tenure of five 
years for the performance bond and Rs 5 billion for the amount of the bid bond. The argument in 
support of a five year performance bond was that after the JV had made large capital investments and 
also opened an escrow account, no separate performance bond was necessary as it would add to costs 
and provide no additional security to the AAI.  
 
The final OMDA incorporated the tenure of the performance bond as five years. The bid bond 
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Termination Payment 
 
The initial documents suggested that in case of termination due to a default by the JV, the entire debt 
would be repaid by the AAI. The PC felt that only 90% should be paid for by the AAI so that some 
risk on that score is borne by the JV and its lenders.  
 
This was incorporated in the final OMDA for the event of company default.  
 
The PC also felt that the initial draft of the SSA was very vocal on government obligations, but 
relatively silent on the consequences of default by the JV. The IMG agreed that the legal consultants 
need to come up with a fresh document restoring the parity of obligations between the two sides. 
The PC was also of the view that the contingent liabilities taken by the GoI were far too onerous 
because  of  the payments  towards termination of  the JV’s  debt, non transfer assets,  and  towards 
equity. This was unlike the typical Build Operate Transfer concessions in other sectors.  
 
Role of Airport Operator 
 
The bid document made it mandatory for participation of an airport operator in the consortium. It 
was pointed out in the IMG that while there were evaluation points to be awarded to the consortium 
based on the airport operator’s capability, there were issues as to whether and how much equity the 
operator should hold and the nature of O&M agreement to be entered into between the airport 
operator and the JV. The bidders could involve an airport operator in the consortium to get past pre 
qualification and to score in technical evaluation, but there was nothing to ensure that the airport 
operator  would  have  any  major  stake  or  say  in  the  JV  and,  therefore,  in  the  management  and 
development of the airport. The PC’s view was that the airport operator should have greater and 
direct responsibility in O&M of the airport and that it should hold at least 10% equity in the JV. The 
PC also pointed out that the OMDA did not require anything more than providing experienced and 
skilled  staff  by  the  airport  operator.  According  to  the  PC,  the  airport  operator  in  the  bidder 
consortium should have been made formally responsible for O&M of the airport.  
 
In  the  final  OMDA,  the  airport  operators  were  required  to  hold  at  least  10%  equity,  and 
consequently, were prime members of the JV. They were expected to enter into an airport operator 
agreement with the JV for an initial minimum period of seven years. The OMDA, however, did not 
require  the  JV  to  entrust  any  O&M  responsibilities  to  the  airport  operator  member  of  the 
consortium. It did not also bind the airport operator member any differently than the other members 
of the consortium. The OMDA stated that the prime members of the consortium (as opposed to 
financial investors) would not reduce their stake in the first five years. However, they could sell their 
stakes to financial investors as long as they continued to hold 10% each and 26% collectively. It was 
pointed out that this sale condition could be redundant since there were no restrictions on re sale by 
financial investors. The final OMDA retained these provisions.  
 
New Competing Airport  
 
Another issue which required the attention of the IMG was related to the conditions spelt out in case 
any new airport was to come up within 150 km radius of the existing airports. The OMDA envisaged 
that the right of first refusal (RoFR) for the development of any such new airport project would be 
with the  winner of the current  bid.  One view was that  a competing  airport  in the vicinity  may 
discourage serious bidders for the current airport. Another view was that bestowing the RoFR would 
deter other bidders for the new airport. The PC did not favor the RoFR. However, they argued that 
in the event it was to be provided, it should be applicable only if the JV participated in the bid for the 
new airport and had its bid within 5% of the highest bidder.  
 
The final OMDA, along with the SSA, provided that in the event the JV of the current airport is not 
the successful bidder for the second airport coming up within 150 km radius, but its bid is within 
10% of the most competitive bid received, the JV will have the RoFR. They would need to match the 
first  ranked  bid  in  terms  of  the  selection  criteria  for  the  second  airport,  provided  the  JV  had 
satisfactory performance, without any material default under any of the project agreements, at the 
time of exercising the RoFR.   
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Mandatory Capital Projects 
 
The RFP envisaged the execution of mandatory capital projects including the completion of those 
initiated earlier by the AAI, before specified deadlines. Further, development of the airports was to be 
based on a master plan with triggers for further developments clearly spelt out. The PC argued that 
the development of the airports was best when done in phases, with immediate requirements being 
limited to mandatory projects.  The IMG agreed with this view, as it phased out the development of 
airports and linked it with the need for expansion and development. This, it was argued, would also 
reduce the pressure on raising tariffs. Earlier, the financial consultant had proposed building in one 
go for the requirements of 2020.  
 
The final OMDA also provided for penalties in case the bidder/JV failed to undertake projects once 
triggered or failed to complete them as per the schedule.  
 
Another issue which arose was the extent of mandatory capital projects to be completed within the 
specified time limit. The PC felt that the list specified by MoCA was on the lower side considering 
the traffic projected in 2010 and left too much to the discretion of the bidder. Besides the pace of 
development, there were issues with regard to the treatment of contracts on ongoing projects. In the 
opinion of the PC, the envisaged process should avoid the contractual difficulties arising out of any 
reassignment of such contracts. The treatment of these contracts and projects should also not result 
in any unexpected gain or loss. Otherwise the bidders would be bidding without their liabilities being 
known ex ante. 
 
Decision Making Process 
 
The process of private participation, which was initiated in 2003, had picked up pace in the last six 
months with a series of meetings of the IMG and with the release of RFP and other documents in 
April 2005. There were several issues brought out in the structure envisaged for private participation. 
Besides the lack of clarity on the tariff regulations coupled with regulatory uncertainties, there were 
several other concerns associated with the various agreements to be entered into with the selected 
bidder. 
 
During the decision making process, one of the members of the IMG felt that the process was being 
rushed  and  not  enough  time  was  being  given  to  the  members  to  go  through  the  transaction 
documents.  Even when  the  comments were  made by  the members, they were not  always  being 
recorded with diligence. The minutes and agenda were not finalized in advance and the views of 
others were not always known to those who attended the meeting.  
 
By the end of this process in August 2005, the member of the IMG representing the PC felt that 
there were significant infirmities in the RFP and other documents released in April 2005.  He felt that 
the RFP could still be modified since the bids were not yet received, and this would avoid problems 
in the future. The MoCA, however, felt that too much time was being lost and the entire process has 
been part of the learning for MoCA. Rather than being ‘perfect’, it was better to go ahead with the 
bid. 
 
Suggested Questions for Discussion 
 
·  What should be done at this stage? 
·  What were the major issues pointed out and why did they need to be addressed? 




On September 14, 2005, five consortiums submitted bids for the Delhi airport, and six did so for the 
Mumbai airport. The process of private participation ran into problems initially on the technical 
evaluation of bids. Towards the end of November 2005, after review of technical scores, two bidders,  
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led by GMR and Reliance, were qualified by the consultants for both the airports. Since only one 
airport could be awarded to one bidder, both the pre qualified bidders would have got one airport 
each. The member from the PC pointed out serious flaws in evaluation. After multiple rounds of 
meetings at various levels, the evaluation process was reviewed by another committee which qualified 
only one bidder, GMR, for the two airports.  
 
On January 24, 2006, the EGoM decided on a modified framework for award of the two airports. To 
ensure competition and better returns to government, the eligibility score was lowered in order to 
pre qualify four bidders for each airport. Since GMR was the only qualified bidder as per the initial 
bid conditions, it was asked to choose one of the two airports provided it matched the highest 
financial bid among the top four. GMR chose Delhi, with the requirement to increase its revenue 
share from 43.64% to 45.99%. The Mumbai airport was awarded to the highest financial bidder 
among  the  other  three,  which  happened  to  be  GVK,  at  38.70%.  The  award  was  disputed  and 
appealed at the Supreme Court by Reliance. While allowing the winners, GMR and GVK, to go 
ahead, the court finally dismissed the appeal on November 7, 2006.  
 
Many issues have arisen subsequent to this process. 
 
In 2008, the Delhi airport JV made an aborted attempt to collect six years’ lease rent for hotel sites by 
way of deposits which were not to be counted as revenue for the purposes of sharing 46% with AAI. 
These deposits were against lease rentals and would also reduce future rentals to the detriment of 
AAI share. The prospective hoteliers were also required to pay directly for infrastructure on the hotel 
sites which meant that they would offer to pay a lower lease rental to the detriment of AAI. Both 
would have reduced the revenue base and consequently the share of AAI, thus altering the bid terms 
in favor of the JV. Media exposure led to a rethink and the proposal had to be abandoned. 
 
To develop the land and commercial activities towards the non aeronautical business, the JV created 
subsidiaries. A significant implication of this would be that the total revenues of the subsidiary would 
not be treated as part of the JV’s revenue and only the dividend paid by the subsidiary would become 
the revenue of AAI, thus reducing the revenue base for sharing. This has been seen as a controversial 
issue.  
 
In terms of capital cost, in the initial bid for Delhi airport, GMR quoted Rs 3,500 crore for phase I 
development of the project to be completed by 2010. In 2007, as per estimates of GMR, the project 
cost was US$ 1.5 billion (approximately Rs 6000 crore). As per media reports towards the end of 
2008 (Exhibit 5), the cost had risen to Rs 9000 crore. Consequent to this and the other viability issues 
in terms of traffic demand and costs, the private airport operators appealed for increased revenues. 
The  MoCA  had  initially  approved  a  ‘user  development  fee’  that  airports  with  significant 
modernization activities could levy on passengers, and subject the same to a revenue share. Given the 
high revenue shares in Delhi and Mumbai, GMR and GVK appealed on this. The fee was converted 
to an ‘airport development fee’, not subject to revenue share. This has also been seen by many as an 
alteration of the bid terms in favour of the JV. 
 
The structuring and award of PPP projects, especially for such large airports, is very complex and 
throws up several significant issues. The inter ministerial consultative processes helped resolve many 
of these issues while some remained. There was a great deal of on the job learning. The outcome is 
seen as a significant success, despite some nagging concerns.  
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Exhibit 1: Key Statistics of Airport Traffic 
 
              % Change 








2004 05 to 
2003 04 
2003 04 to 
2002 03 




onal  158  133  116  108  18.8  14.7  7.4 
Domesti




Total  730  639  560  510  14.2  14.1  9.8 
Internati
onal  19.5  16.6  14.8  13.6  17.5  12.2  8.8 
Domesti




Total  59.5  48.7  43.7  40  22.2  11.4  9.3 
Internati
onal  825  693  646  560  19.0  7.3  15.4 
Domesti





Total  1290  1068  979  854  20.8  9.1  14.6 
Delhi Airport 
Aircrafts  movement 
(thousands)  122  106  93  86  15.1  14.0  8.1 
Passenger  movement 
(million)  12.8  10.2  8.8  8.2  25.5  15.9  7.3 
Cargo  movement 
(thousand tons)  344  296  276  233  16.2  7.2  18.5 
Mumbai Airport 
Aircrafts  movement 
(thousands)  153  137  126  115  11.7  8.7  9.6 
Passenger  movement 
(million)  15.7  12.8  11.7  11  22.7  9.4  6.4 
Cargo  movement 
(thousand tons)  403  326  308  276  23.6  5.8  11.6 
 
[MoCA, Various Years]  
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Exhibit 2: Aeronautical Services 
 
‘Aeronautical Services’ means the provision of the following facilities and services:  
 
1.  provision of flight operation assistance and crew support systems;  
2.  ensuring the safe and secure operation of the Airport, excluding national security interest;  
3.  the movement and parking of aircraft and control facilities;  
4.  general maintenance and upkeep of the Airport;  
5.  the maintenance facilities and the control of them and hangarage of aircraft;  
6.  flight information display screens;  
7.  rescue and fire fighting services;  
8.  management and administration of personnel employed at the Airport;  
9.  the movement of staff and passengers and their inter change between all modes of transport at 
the Airport;  
10.  operation and maintenance of passenger boarding and disembarking systems, including vehicles 
to perform remote boarding; and  
11.  any other services deemed to be necessary for the safe and efficient operation of the Airport.  
 
A more detailed list of the above facilities and services would include the following:  
 
12.  Aerodrome control services  
13.  Airfield  
14.  Airfield lighting  
15.  Air taxi services  
16.  Airside and land side access roads and forecourts including writing, traffic signals, signage and 
monitoring  
17.  Common hydrant infrastructure for aircraft fuelling services by authorized providers  
18.  Apron and aircraft parking area  
19.  Apron control and allocation of aircraft stands  
20.  Arrivals concourses and meeting areas  
21.  Baggage systems including outbound and reclaim  
22.  Bird scaring  
23.  Check in concourses  
24.  Cleaning, heating, lighting and air conditioning public areas  
25.  Customs and immigration halls  
26.  Emergency services  
27.  Facilities for the disabled and other special needs people  
28.  Fire service  
29.  Flight information and public address systems  
30.  Foul and surface water drainage  
31.  Guidance systems and marshalling  
32.  Information desks  
33.  Inter terminal transit systems  
34.  Lifts, escalators and passenger conveyors  
35.  Loading bridges  
36.  Lost property 
37.  Passenger and hand baggage search  
38.  Piers and gate rooms  
39.  Policing and general security  
40.  Prayer rooms  
41.  Infrastructure/facilities for post offices  
42.  Infrastructure/facilities for public telephones 
43.  Infrastructure/facilities for banks  
44.  Infrastructure/facilities for bureaux de change  
45.  Runways  
46.  Signage   
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47.  Staff search  
48.  Taxiways  
49.  Toilets and nursing mothers rooms  
50.  Waste and refuse treatment and disposal  
51.  X Ray service for carry on and checked in luggage  
52.  VIP/special lounges  
  
[MoCA, 2005a and MoCA 2005b (Schedule 5, OMDA)]  
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Exhibit 3: Non-Aeronautical Services 
 





1.  Aircraft cleaning services  
2.  Airline lounges  
3.  Cargo handling  
4.  Cargo terminals  
5.  General aviation services (other than those used for commercial air transport services ferrying 
passengers or cargo or a combination of both)  
6.  Ground handling services  
7.  Hangars  
8.  Heavy maintenance services for aircrafts  




10.  Banks/ATM 
11.  Bureaux de change 
12.  Business centres 
13.  Conference centre  
14.  Duty free sales  
15.  Flight catering services  
16.  Freight consolidators/forwarders or agents  
17.  General retail shops   
18.  Hotels and motels  
19.  Hotel reservation services  
20.  Line maintenance services  
21.  Locker rental  
22.  Logistic centres 
23.  Messenger services  
24.  Porter service  
25.  Restaurants, bars and other refreshment facilities  
26.  Special assistance services  
27.  Tourist information services  
28.  Travel agency  
29.  Vehicle fuelling services  
30.  Vehicle rental  
31.  Vehicle parking  
32.  Vending machines  
33.  Warehouses 
34.  Welcoming services  
35.  Other activities related to passenger services at the airport, if the same is a Non Aeronautical 
Asset.  
 
[MoCA 2005a and MoCA 2005b (Schedule 6, OMDA)]  
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Exhibit 4: Calculating the Aeronautical Charges in the Shared Till Inflation – 
X Price Cap Model 
 
The revenue target is defined as follows  
 
TR
i  = RB









TR = target revenue, 
  
RB  =  regulatory  base  pertaining  to  Aeronautical  Assets  and  any  investments  made  for  the 
performance of Reserved Activities etc. which are owned by the JVC, after incorporating efficient 
capital expenditure but does not include capital work in progress to the extent not capitalised in fixed 
assets. It is further clarified that working capital shall not be included as part of regulatory base. It is 
further clarified that penalties and Liquidated Damages, if any, levied as per the provisions of the 
OMDA would not be allowed for capitalisation in the regulatory base. It is further clarified that the 
Upfront  Fee  and  any  pre operative  expenses  incurred  by  the  Successful  Bidder  towards  bid 
preparation will not be allowed to be capitalised in the regulatory base.  
 
WACC = nominal post tax weighted average cost of capital, calculated using the marginal rate of 
corporate tax.  
 
OM = efficient operation and maintenance cost pertaining to Aeronautical Services. It is clarified that 
penalties and Liquidated Damages, if any, levied as per the provisions of the OMDA would not be 
allowed as part of operation and maintenance cost.  
 
D = depreciation calculated in the manner as prescribed in Schedule XIV of the Indian Companies 
Act, 1956. In the event, the depreciation rates for certain assets are not available in the aforesaid Act, 
then the depreciation rates as provided in the Income Tax Act for such asset as converted to straight 
line method from the written down value method will be considered. In the event, such rates are not 
available in either of the Acts then depreciation rates as per generally accepted Indian accounting 
standards may be considered.  
 
T = corporate taxes on earnings pertaining to Aeronautical Services.  
 
S = 30% of the gross revenue generated by the JVC from the Revenue Share Assets. The costs in 
relation to such revenue shall not be included while calculating Aeronautical Charges. ‘Revenue Share 
Assets’ shall mean (a) Non Aeronautical Assets; and (b) assets required for provision of aeronautical 
related services arising at the Airport and not considered in revenues from Non Aeronautical Assets 
(eg Public admission fee etc). 
 










 RB0 for the first regulatory period would be the sum total of  
(i) the Book Value of the Aeronautical Assets in the books of the JVC and  
(ii)  the  hypothetical  regulatory  base  computed  using  the  then  prevailing  tariff  and  the  revenues, 
operation and maintenance cost, corporate tax pertaining to Aeronautical Services at the Airport, 
during the financial year preceding the date of such computation.  
 
I = investment undertaken in the period  
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The  X  factor  is  calculated  by  determining  the  X  factor  that  equates  the  present  value  over  the 
regulatory period of the target revenue with the present value that results from applying the forecast 
traffic volume with a price path based on the initial average aeronautical charge, increased by CPI 
minus X for each year. That is, the following equation is solved for X:  
 
                                                                   
     
          n      RBi x  WACCi  + OMi   +  Di  + Ti     Si                 n      m         ACi,j x Ti,j     
        Σ  _________________________________  = Σ    Σ      ___________ 
       i = 1                   ( 1 + WACCi)
i                                i = 1 j = 1     (1+WACCi)
i    
                                               
Where  
AC
i,j   = average aeronautical charge for the j
th category of aeronautical revenue in the i
th year  
T
i,j   = volume of the j
th category of aeronautical traffic in the i
th year  
X  = escalation factor  
n  = number of years considered in the regulatory period  
m  = number of categories of aeronautical revenue e.g. landing charges, parking charges,         
housing charges, Facilitation Component etc.  
 
The maximum average aeronautical charge (price cap) in a particular year ‘i’ for a particular category 








CPI = average annual inflation rate as measured by change in the All India Consumer Price Index 




[MoCA, 2005c (Schedule 1, SSA)]  
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Exhibit 5: Raise Airport Charges: GMR, GVK 
 
NEW DELHI: Facing significant revenue erosion because of the slowdown in air traffic, the private 
players involved in developing Delhi and Mumbai airports sought the government's clearance to raise 
10% aeronautical charges along with some other relief. Otherwise, they warned, the development 
work at both places and the meeting of the all important 2010 deadline in Delhi may suffer. 
 
GMR  and  GVK  airport  chiefs  Kiran  Kumar  Grandhi  and  Sanjay  Reddy  are learnt to have told 
aviation secretary M Madhavan Nambiar on Wednesday that the two busiest airports have witnessed 
a 16% to 18% drop in domestic traffic because of which the revenue from aircraft movement and 
passengers has declined. The crash in real estate markets has given a blow to the body as the Rs 9,000 
apiece projects were to raise Rs 2,700 crore from realty in Delhi and Rs 2,400 crore from realty and 
income accruals in Mumbai.  "The two players asked the government to allow them to raise aero 
charges by 10% as this is allowed under the agreement. But since this would put additional pressure 
on airlines, the move has not been allowed so far. They also asked that the shortfall in expected 
revenue real estate be made good through some other measure. The airport developers cited lower 
earnings had resulted in banks getting un enthusiastic about lending more to them," said sources. 
Thanks to the overall liquidity crunch, the two have now dues to the tune of Rs 400 crore from 
airlines, concessionaires and oil companies. 
 
The developers also raised some other issues with the government. The GMR backed Delhi airport 
developer  now  expects a significant shortfall  in  the  Rs 2,700 crore it  expected to  raise from its 
upcoming hotel district. It has sought permission to make good this shortfall through some other way 
like a levy on passengers. 
 
The  GVK backed  Mumbai  airport  developer  had  mostly  land related  issues.  But  it  had  another 
interesting problem. Some months back, its power connection category was changed from industrial 
to the more expensive commercial one. As a result of this, its earlier monthly power bill of Rs 5 crore 
has shot up to Rs 7 crore. They sought the aviation ministry's help on this issue. 
 
A  senior  ministry  official  admitted  that  the  developers  were  in  a  difficult  situation.  "The  entire 
aviation industry is in a bind. Passenger numbers have fallen and airlines are under financial stress. 
Despite reducing fleets, they are incurring huge losses and not paying their charges to airports on 
time. So the combined impact of a lower revenue and not getting even that on time is hurting the 
developers," said a senior official. 
 
[ToI, 2008]  
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AAI  Airports Authority of India 
AERA  Airport Economic Regulatory Authority 
CPI  Consumer Price Index 
EGoM  Empowered Group of Ministers 
GoI  Government of India 
IMG  Inter Ministerial Group 
JV  Joint Venture 
MoCA  Ministry of Civil Aviation 
O&M  Operations and Maintenance 
OMDA  Operation, Management and Development Agreement 
PC  Planning Commission 
PPP  Public Private Partnership 
RFP  Request for Proposal 
RoFR  Right of First Refusal 
SSA  State Support Agreement 
 